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Lines in the Sand: Drawing Meaningful Contours for the 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine 
(In a World at War)
Malissa M. Tucker1
Genocide, war crimes, and human rights atrocities have long plagued modern human 
civilization.2 Some of  the most tragic instances have occurred recently, beginning with the 
Holocaust, and including other major loss of  human life in Rwanda, Cambodia, Iraq, and the 
Balkans.3  Despite this troubling history, mass – but preventable – human suffering continues today, 
most notably in Syria.4  Although there is some consensus among international stakeholders that 
a “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) exists, many, including the United States, continue to struggle 
with defining and implementing a workable humanitarian intervention policy.5  This article argues 
that in order to fulfill its recognized R2P obligations, the United States must clarify its humanitarian 
intervention strategy and become a genuine leader in the R2P movement.  In doing so the United 
States should build a consensus on what the R2P doctrine means and requires, as well as be willing 
to act in the face of  humanitarian crises.    
Without a well-structured R2P agenda, the United States has failed to stop troubling national 
security dilemmas, calling into question its commitment to protecting vulnerable populations, and 
adding to skepticism in the international community over whether R2P is a worthwhile policy.6  This 
ambiguity stymies dialogue on the duty owed to vulnerable people and inhibits action in the face of  
grave atrocities.7  Importantly, the United States has not yet established the Responsibility to Protect 
as a legal norm.  Rather, R2P has been regarded as an important, but increasingly superficial, moral 
and national security obligation – one that critics have argued to overhaul, or worse, to do away 
1 J.D. Candidate, May 2016, The Catholic University of  America, Columbus School of  Law; B.A., 2010, American 
Military University. The author would like to thank her husband James and Professor Sandra Hodgkinson for their 
inspiration and support in crafting this article.  She also gives her sincerest gratitude to the American University 
Washington College of  Law, National Security Law Brief  staff  for this opportunity and their insightful feedback. 
2  Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: The Global history of  Genocide, open demoCraCy (Oct. 11, 2007), https://www.opendemocracy.
net/article/blood_and_soil_the_global_history_of_genocide. 
3  united human rights CounCil, Genocide in Rwanda, available at http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/genocide_in_
rwanda.htm (last accessed Mar. 24, 2015) (noting that in Rwanda, during April 1994, over 800,000 Tutsi men, women, 
and children were slaughtered by extremists from the rival ethnic Hutu faction); See also  Rwandan Genocide: 100 Days of  
Slaughter, bbC news, (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506. 
4  united to end genoCide, Syria, http://endgenocide.org/conflict-areas/syria/ (last accessed Oct. 21, 2014). 
5  Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come—And Gone?, the eConomist (July 23, 2009), http://www.
economist.com/node/14087788 (discussing criticisms by U.N. member states of  the manner in which the United States 
and other countries have wielded R2P).
6   Id.
7 . Id.
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with completely.8  Many countries, including Russia and China, have historically been reluctant to 
support United Nations (U.N.) intervention, and critics contend that the United States likewise has 
not clearly signaled its willingness to adopt the very legal, social, or political framework necessary to 
make the R2P doctrine viable.9 
This article examines why the United States must lead the international community in 
implementing a genuine and practicable R2P doctrine, and where we have failed at upholding 
our duty to protect.  Part I of  this article introduces the Responsibility to Protect and provides 
a historical overview of  how it arose.  In Part II, this article analyzes how the United States has 
attempted to implement humanitarian intervention using several case studies in Kosovo, Libya, and 
Syria.  In Part III, this article explores why the issue of  R2P is so critical for U.S. national security, 
the drivers behind the international community’s failure to meaningfully implement R2P, and gives 
suggestions for changing those drivers.  Finally, this article argues that the responsibility to protect 
can only become an impactful and truly sound policy if  the United States leads the international 
community in resolving the surrounding ambiguity, indecisiveness, and inaction.  A renewed U.S. 
commitment to R2P will help create the legal norms, political will, and partnerships necessary to 
prioritize national security, justice, and most importantly, the protection of  human life.      
i. the great awaKening: defining r2p and the “movement toward human seCurity”
 The R2P doctrine is rooted in the concept of  humanitarian military intervention, which has 
been practiced since at least the end of  the Cold War.10  It was not until 2005 at the United Nations 
World Summit, that the international community came to a consensus on needing to institutionalize 
R2P as a norm.11  Since 2005, proponents of  R2P have struggled to make it a meaningful or 
effective practice among international stakeholders.12  The following discussion documents this 
troubled evolution, and highlights the reasons why there is debate surrounding humanitarian military 
intervention in general.13 
A. Defining the Responsibility to Protect
The term “responsibility to protect” is based on a long history of  international humanitarian 
8  Jayshree Bajoria & Robert McMahon, The Dilemma of  Humanitarian Intervention, CounCil of foreign relations (Jun. 
12, 2013), available at http://www.cfr.org/humanitarian-intervention/dilemma-humanitarian-intervention/p16524.
9  Id. 
10  The Responsibility To Protect, Report of  The International Commission on Intervention And State Sovereignty, available at 
http://www.idrc.ca/EN/Resources/Publications/openebooks/960-7/index.html (last accessed Mar. 23, 2015).
11  Report of  the Secretary-General, Responsibility To Protect: Timely And Decisive Response, U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. No. a/66/874–s/2012/578 (July, 25, 2012). 
12  Id.
13  Chaim Kaufmann, See No Evil: Why America Doesn’t Stop Genocide, foreign affairs (July/Aug. 2002), available at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58061/chaim-kaufmann/see-no-evil-why-america-doesn-t-stop-genocide (asserting that America 
has failed to stop genocide due to a lack of  knowledge, will, and action); See also Bajoria, supra note 7 (noting that the U.S. 
has tempered its use of  R2P due to past bad precedent and the ambiguity of  a workable legal framework for compelling 
action).
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crises, but it was not until the Rwandan genocide of  the 1990s that the term became widely 
adopted.14  At its heart the doctrine stands for the precept that the international community cannot 
passively watch people become the subjects of  genocide, war crimes, or human rights atrocities.15   
Instead, international actors will use necessary means – including military action – to prevent, 
identify, and end such crimes.  Since its inception, the U.N. and U.S. policy communities have 
reiterated that R2P stands on three pillars.16  First, individual states have a duty to protect their 
populations from atrocities. 17  Second, international community members have an obligation to help 
states fulfill this duty, including by “assisting those which are under stress, before crises and conflicts 
break out.”18  Third, in accordance with the U.N. Charter, including Chapter VII, the international 
community should take coordinated and “collective action” in cases where states fail to protect their 
populations.19
Despite a common understanding about the need to stop atrocities, the R2P doctrine has not 
come full-circle to enact the protections that it promises.  No single actor has undertaken the task 
of  resolving the ambiguities and failures responsible for R2P shortfalls, though many, including the 
United States, have tried to apply the still-nascent policy to evolving global crises.20  This haphazard 
application of  R2P reveals the need to develop and strengthen the doctrine, and has also presented 
unintended impediments to practicing humanitarian intervention in the future by setting some 
arguably bad precedent.21 
Despite this inconsistent application of  the R2P doctrine, the United States has taken pains 
to reiterate its commitment to, in the words of  President Obama, “never again” allow genocide and 
other atrocities to take place without a coordinated international response.22  In April 2012, President 
Obama drew applause from an audience gathered at the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. 
when he asserted that the prevention of  genocide and human rights atrocities were “a core national 
security interest and a core moral responsibility of  the United States.”23  He added that “awareness 
14  R2P: A Short History, united nations regional information Centre for western europe, http://www.unric.
org/en/responsibility-to-protect/26981-r2p-a-short-history (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
15  White House Press Release, Remarks by the President at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (Apr. 23, 2012, 
10:00 AM), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/04/23/president-obama-speaks-preventing-mass-
atrocities#transcript.
16  Report of  the Secretary-General, supra note 10; See also Responsibility to Protect Working Group, united states 
institute of peaCe, available at http://www.usip.org/programs/projects/responsibility-protect-working-group (last accessed Mar. 24, 
2015). 
17  Report of  the Secretary-General, supra note 10. 
18  Id.  
19  Id.   
20  See, e.g., Jayshree Bajoria, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, The Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 24, 2011), 
http://www.cfr.org/libya/libya-responsibility-protect/p24480 (describing one such application in Libya by the United 
States and the international community).
21  See the eConomist, supra note 4.
22  White House Press Release, supra note 14.
23  Id.; See Thomas Omestad, USIP, Partners Release Report on Realizing ‘Responsibility to Protect’, u.s. inst. of peaCe, Jul. 
23, 2013, http://www.usip.org/publications/usip-partners-release-report-realizing-responsibility-protect; See also Jonas Claes, Obama 
Announces Formation of  the Atrocities Prevention Board, u.s. inst. of peaCe, , Apr. 23, 2012, http://www.usip.org/publications/
obama-announces-formation-the-atrocities-prevention-board.
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without action changes nothing” and that the promise of “never again” was a “challenge to us 
all – to pause and to look within.” 24  With this apt invitation to evaluate what the responsibility to 
protect mandates, we first must survey of  how the R2P doctrine came into being. 
B. History of  the Responsibility to Protect
Before the R2P doctrine was formalized, it was practiced as humanitarian military 
intervention in a limited number of  cases in the 1990s.25  In many of  those instances, intervention 
was unsuccessful at stopping the massive loss of  life and atrocities that came to characterize the 
post-Cold War era – and no single mission wholly prevented atrocities from starting in the first 
place.26  This early chapter of  humanitarian intervention revealed deep-seated division over whether 
it was an appropriate practice, and how and when it should be invoked.27  This period also tested 
international community members’ willingness to prioritize the protection of  innocent people.28  
To a large extent, these issues were not resolved but exacerbated by the introduction of  R2P as an 
emerging yet nebulous intervention model.29  To understand why, it is useful to look at how genocide 
became commonplace and how international actors responded or failed to respond. 
i. One by One: How Genocide Became Commonplace and Why We Struggled to Stop It
Humanitarian military intervention emerged relatively recently, following the end of  the 
Cold War.30  Western nations, bolstered by the “defeat” of  Communism, began to survey a world 
full of  potential, but with unfortunate disparity and volatility, especially in post-Communist and 
persistently underdeveloped states. 31  As Jon Western and Joshua Goldstein observe, after the end 
of  the Cold War  “A new and unsettled world order took shape, one seemingly distinguished by the 
frequency and brutality of  wars and the deliberate targeting of  civilians,” all of  which took center 
stage in a globalizing and quickly technologically advancing world.32  This “new world order” called 
into question the inviolability of  state sovereignty, and the role of  the international community in 
preventing and stopping human atrocities.33 
Leading up to and during the post-Cold War period, several events in particular shocked 
24  White House Press Release, supra note 14. 
25  Article 28: Right to Social and International Order Permitting These Freedoms To Be Released, bbC news,  http://www.bbc.
co.uk/worldservice/people/features/ihavearightto/four_b/casestudy_art28.shtml (last accessed Mar. 23, 2015).
26  See generally Bajoria, supra note 7.
27  Id.
28  Id.
29  Id.
30  Jon Western & Joshua S. Goldstein, Humanitarian Intervention Comes of  Age: Lessons From Somalia to Libya, foreign 
affairs  (Nov./Dec. 2011), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136502/jon-western-and-joshua-s-goldstein/
humanitarian-intervention-comes-of-age. 
31  Id.
32  Id.
33  Walden Bello, The Checkered History of  Humanitarian Intervention, transnational institute (Sep. 6, 2013), available at 
http://www.tni.org/print/article/checkered-history-humanitarian-intervention. 
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the global conscience.  These instances provided the basis for the humanitarian intervention we 
know today.  In 1987 and again in 1988, the world witnessed an outright failure to protect Iraq’s 
Kurdish minority.  The Iraqi government, led by then-president Saddam Hussein, gassed Iraqi Kurds 
with lethal mixtures of  sarin, tabun, mustard, and VX gas, and killed thousands of  others, often 
discarding their bodies in mass graves.34  According to media reports, an estimated 3,200-5,000 
people died in a single gas attack in the village of  Halabja, and many survivors continue to suffer 
long-term adverse health effects, such as congenital birth defects and high cancer rates.35  
Although, as U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power points out, the United States did not 
deem the actions against the Kurds as “genocide” until 1995, and no Iraqi was ever prosecuted 
internationally for their involvement the attacks, the interceding years provided a brief  glimpse of  
humanitarian military intervention in practice.36  In 1991, Hussein’s invasion of  Kuwait sparked the 
100-hour First Gulf  War.37  At the start of  the conflict, the United States encouraged those under 
Hussein’s rule, including the Kurds who had been slaughtered several years earlier, to rebel against 
the Iraqi government.38   Notably, the United States did nothing to support the rebellion militarily, 
but along with their NATO partners, eventually provided “safehaven” under Operation Provide 
Comfort to Kurds fleeing Iraqi retaliation. 39  This protection was necessary, but only occurred after 
an estimated tens of  thousands of  people had already been killed and countless thousands more had 
gone missing.40  
The U.N. Security Council had not explicitly authorized collective military action in Iraq, 
choosing instead to issue U.N. Resolution 688, which sought to end the “repression of  the Iraqi 
civilian population,” including the Kurds, and left the door open for invoking Chapter VII of  the 
U.N. Charter if  Iraq did not comply.41  Citing the Resolution as authority, NATO partners instituted 
a no-fly zone in northern Iraq.42  The Resolution did not explicitly provide for such a measure, 
prompting the U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to later condemn the imposition of  
the no-fly zones as “illegal.”43  Despite the disagreement over what collective action was legal and 
34  Saddam’s Iraq: Key Events, bbC news, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/02/iraq_events/html/chemical_
warfare.stm (last accessed Dec. 1, 2014); See also Samantha Power, a problem from hell: ameriCa and the age of 
genoCide 197, 241 (2013). 
35  saddam’s iraq, supra note 33; See also Power, supra note 33, at 188-90.
36  Power, supra note 33, at 245.
37  The First Gulf  War, u.s. dep’t of state,  https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/firstgulf (last accessed 
Dec. 15, 2014). 
38  Power, supra note 33, at 237.
39  Id. at 241; See also saddam’s iraq, supra note 33. 
40  power, supra note 33, at 240-41; See also bbC news, supra note 33. 
41  S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR S/22442 (Apr. 5, 1991), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/
GEN/NR0/596/24/IMG/NR059624.pdf?OpenElement. 
42  See UN Security Council Resolution 688, Iraq, CounCil on foreign relations (Apr. 5, 1991), http://www.cfr.org/
international-organizations-and-alliances/un-security-council-resolution-688-iraq/p11206 (noting that the no-fly 
zone “was not explicit in the resolution” but that NATO partners believed it was implied “in order to protect both 
ground troops entering the area and airdrops of  aid to the Kurdish population.”); See also Ctr. for the study of 
interventionism, UN Security Council Resolution 688 on Iraq (5 Apr. 1991), http://www.interventionism.info/en/UNSC-Res-688 
(last accessed Dec. 14, 2014) (submitting that Boutros-Ghali labeled the no-fly zones as “illegal” in a 2003 interview).   
43  See id.   
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necessary in Iraq, Ambassador Power notes that the Operation “marked unprecedented intervention 
in the internal affairs of  a state for humanitarian reasons.”44  
Then, in September 1992, U.S. Marines landed in Somalia to restore humanitarian assistance 
amid a raging civil war in that country.45  Despite the earlier operation in Iraq, this brand of  U.S. 
humanitarian military intervention was still not an established practice, and the mission quickly 
expanded to restoring Somalia’s government, including by using Special Operations Forces (“SOF”) 
to remove local warlords.46  In October 1993, during one such SOF mission, America’s humanitarian 
intervention in Somalia took a catastrophic turn when local insurgents killed 18 U.S. service 
members in the famed “Black Hawk Down” incident.47  Understandably, this tragedy added to an 
already skittish intervention policy – one that Mark Bowden, journalist and observer of  the Somali 
campaign, said caused “an excessive concern [to] avoid risking American forces on the ground” in 
the 1990s, and that “continues to play a role in foreign policy decisions” today.48  
While the United States recalculated its role as intervener after Somalia, intra-state and 
regional conflict continued to proliferate and produce atrocities across the globe for well over the 
next decade.49  Between 1992 and 1995, the breakup of  former Yugoslavia hurled the defunct state’s 
six provinces of  Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia 
into an inter-ethnic civil war.50  Under the authoritarian rule of  staunch Serbian nationalist Slobodan 
Milosevic, Serb forces began “cleansing” their territory of  ethnic Muslims and Croats in Bosnia after 
the region declared independence in 1992.51  
Despite ample warning regarding the hostilities in former Yugoslavia and credible notice 
of  the mass killings that were taking place in Bosnia, the United States responded by supporting a 
fruitless European-led peace process.52  With peace nowhere in sight, and the borrowed time and 
leeway emboldening Serb aggression, American policymakers largely chose to stay out of  the fray 
because, as Ambassador Power points out, the cause was seen as purely humanitarian – i.e., not one 
that directly threatened America’s interests.53  
Turmoil in the Balkans would not soon end.  In 1995, Milosevic’s forces overran the U.N. 
44  Power, supra note 33, at 241.
45  The United States Army in Somalia: 1992-1994, u.s. army Center of military history (last visited Mar. 24, 2015), 
available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8364-2004Sep9.html.  
46  Id. 
47  Id.  
48  What a Downed Black Hawk in Somalia Taught America, npr (Oct. 5, 2013, 4:45 PM), http://www.npr.
org/2013/10/05/229561805/what-a-downed-black-hawk-in-somalia-taught-america.  
49  Id.
50  Milestones: 1989-1992 - The Breakup of  Yugoslavia, 1990-1992, u.s. dep’t of state (last aCCessed mar. 24), https://
history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/breakup-yugoslavia. 
51  Id. 
52  Id.; See also Power, supra note 33, at 259.
53  Power, supra note 33, at 260-62 (stating that, in evaluating U.S. policy toward Bosnia, Joint Chiefs of  Staff  Colin 
Powell, invoked former defense secretary Caspar Weinberger’s five-part criteria for armed intervention, which required 
that military force only be used to (1) protect the “vital interests of  the United States or its allies,” (2) with the ultimate 
intent to win, (3) in “pursuit of  clearly defined political and military objectives,” (4) accompanied by “widespread public 
and congressional support,” and (5) used only as a last resort – none of  which were present or feasible in Bosnia).
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safe-zone in the city of  Srebrenica and began ethnically cleansing the city’s Muslim inhabitants, 
murdering an estimated 40,000 before a three-week NATO bombing campaign finally drove 
Milosevic to agree to stop attacking civilians.54  In 1999, as tensions once again flared, this time 
in the Bosnian province of  Kosovo, NATO, backed largely by U.S. military power, conducted the 
first substantial humanitarian military intervention campaign to prevent Serbs from committing yet 
another genocide. 55  Given its pivotal nature, the Kosovo campaign will be discussed in depth in 
Part II, where this article evaluates U.S. intervention strategies. 
 Amid the conflict in former Yugoslavia yet another tragedy unfolded, this time in Rwanda.  
In April 1994, “extremists” from the rival ethnic Hutu faction slaughtered over 800,000 Tutsi 
men, women, and children.56  In one infamous and chilling account, seven Tutsi pastors who had 
taken refuge among hundreds in a local church, asked the Hutu bishop there to intercede in their 
slaughter.57  The Hutu bishop never did and was later indicted at The Hague for allegedly organizing 
the massacre.58  Despite these troubling reflections, the world was still slow to react. 59  For its part, 
the United States did virtually nothing to stop the conflict. 60  In fact, U.S. officials did not publicly 
recognize the killings as genocide until long after they had occurred. 61 
In total, the end of  the twentieth century left the international community with a gruesome 
prospect – refuse to intervene in the name of  state sovereignty and continue to watch helpless 
civilians die, or rethink the way we viewed, and held ourselves accountable for, using all means 
necessary to stop bona fide human suffering.62  Though the Treaty of  Westphalia in 1648 had loosely 
54  See id. at 391-95, 439-40 (detailing the horrific ethnic cleansing campaign undertaken by Milosevic in July 1995 
against Muslim inhabitants of  Srebrenica and the tragically late efforts of  the U.S. to spur NATO involvement, which 
did not commence to stp the genocide until Aug. 30, 1995). 
55  See id. at 443, 446-47 (noting that after Serb forces began attacking ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, the negotiated 
peace settlement fell through and the U.S. more readily responded by urging and executing a NATO bombing campaign 
than they had in any previous Balkans conflict). 
56  Genocide in Rwanda, united human rights CounCil, http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/genocide_in_
rwanda.htm (last accessed Mar. 23, 2015) (noting that in Rwanda, during April 1994, over 800,000 Tutsi men, women, 
and children were slaughtered by extremists from the rival ethnic Hutu faction); See also Rwandan Genocide: 100 Days of  
Slaughter, bbC news (Apr. 6, 2014, 8:25 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506. 
57  C-span Interview with Philip Gourevitch, Author of We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With 
Our Families (Nov. 22, 1998), available at http://www.booknotes.org/Watch/115511-1/Philip+Gourevitch.aspx (last accessed Mar. 
23, 2015). 
58  Id. 
59  Genocide in Rwanda, supra note 55 (noting that “Policymakers in France, Belgium, and the United States and at the 
United Nations were aware of  the preparations for massive slaughter and failed to take the steps needed to prevent it. 
Aware from the start that Tutsi were being targeted for elimination, the leading foreign actors refused to acknowledge 
the genocide.”); See also 100 Days of  Slaughter, supra note 55. 
60  Kaufmann, supra note 12 (asserting that there were only cursory recommendations to resurrect defunct peace 
accords and no “high-level meeting of  foreign policy principals was ever held, with the result that no one demanded 
any serious analyses of  the crisis.  This fact alone virtually assured that no rescue plans could be developed, and mid-
level officials who attempted to raise this issue were branded naive or alarmist.  The U.S. response to Rwanda, in short, 
constituted a classic case of  non-evaluation”). 
61  Glen Kessler and Colum Lynch, U.S. Calls Killings in Sudan Genocide, washington post (Sep. 10, 2004), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8364-2004Sep9.html; See also Kaufmann, supra note 12. 
62  outreaCh program on the rwanda genoCide & the u.n., Background Note: The Responsibility to Protect (Mar. 2014), 
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established the concept of  state sovereignty, much had changed in the 352 years since.63  Now, with 
global relations more interconnected and internal state matters more ascertainable than ever, our 
understanding of  sovereignty had to shift to fit a new paradigm.64  
This shift allowed international stakeholders to begin critically analyzing what duties an 
autonomous state owed their people for having the ‘privilege’ of  independence.65  The shift also 
served to illuminate the international duty to intervene when a state failed to uphold those duties.66  
In 2000, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan remarked “If  humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an 
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross 
and systematic violation of  human rights that offend every precept of  our common humanity?”67  
Annan’s point was clear: If  sovereignty was not an infallible shield under which rulers were allowed 
to slaughter their own people, the world needed to find a legal and legitimate way to challenge it and 
to protect human life in the process.68 
ii. A New World Order, New World Solutions: International Responses to an Age Old Controversy
By 2001, surveying the tumult of  the 1990s and responding to Secretary General Annan’s 
challenge, some governments decided it was time to establish a norm on intervention.69  Canada’s 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was the first to offer a newly 
named framework for intervention – “The Responsibility to Protect” – and to undertake an 
explanation of  what that responsibility required.70  In their seminal report on R2P, the Commission 
noted that, “the issue of  intervention for human protection purposes has been seen as one of  the 
most controversial and difficult of  all international relations questions.”71  The report, published just 
three months after the 9/11 attacks, struggled to contemplate how these brazen acts of  international 
terrorism would impact the R2P landscape, but nonetheless made the case for never again allowing 
genocide and atrocities to transpire while the international community remained haplessly entangled 
in the debate over what to do.72 
The report raised several significant points.  First, it argued that the Responsibility to Protect 
available at http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/Backgrounder%20R2P%202014.pdf. 
63  See Derek Croxton, The Peace of  Westphalia of  1648 & The Origins of  Sovereignty, XXI, No. 3 the int’l history rev. 
569, 579-82 (1999) (discussing how the Treaty of  Westphalia did not explicitly establish the concept of  sovereignty, 
rather the concept was implied by the framers’ intent & the customary practices that developed in response to its 
implementation). 
64  See, e.g., Western, supra note 29. 
65  See, e.g., International Development Research Center, The Responsibility to Protect, international Commission on 
intervention and state sovereignty vii (Dec. 2001). 
66  Id. 
67  u.n. millennium assembly report of the seCretary-general, we the peoples, the role of the united 
nations in the 21-st Century, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 27, 2000); See also Outreach 
Program, supra note 61 at 1. 
68  See id. 
69  See, e.g., Int’l Dev. Research Ctr., supra note 64 at vii. 
70  Id. 
71  Id. 
72  Id.  
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had three parts: to prevent, to react, and to rebuild, with prevention being the most important 
cornerstone of  the doctrine. 73  The report also judged that military action was at the extreme end 
of  the responsibility spectrum, just and appropriate only where there was objectively perceived or 
real “large scale loss of  life” or “large scale ethnic cleansing” taking place.74  To invoke collective 
military action, the report suggested that four precautionary principles needed to be met: (1) the 
primary intention had to be to end human suffering; (2) military action had to be used only as a “last 
resort”; (3) applied only through proportional means; and (4) with reasonable prospects of  success. 
75  Finally, the report stressed that to be legal, any action needed to comply with the U.N. Charter 
and be approved by the U.N. Security Council. 76   
Finally, at the 2005 U.N. World Summit, world leaders agreed to adopt the Responsibility to 
Protect as a guiding principle, setting a new custom for intervention.77  U.N. Special Adviser Edward 
Luck explained that the impetus for international community members adopting R2P grew out of  
the idea that a policy shift from “non-interference to non-indifference” was necessary. 78  Invoking 
the memories of  past genocide and other atrocities in the Balkans, Rwanda, and Cambodia, Luck 
noted that R2P was a “movement toward human security.”79  Luck added that the framework for 
R2P was still being developed, but he echoed the requirement that any action under the doctrine 
must comply with the U.N. Charter and have Security Council approval.80  
The United States worked to give special significance to R2P, building on its earlier, but 
what some have called half-hearted, commitment to end genocide.81  This prior commitment 
arose between 1946-1948 when the United States spearheaded the drafting of  the Convention on 
Genocide.82  As critics have noted, however, the United States did not ratify the Convention until 40 
years later in 1987, with the passage of  the Proxmire Act, also known as the Genocide Convention 
Implementation Act of  1987.83  This created America’s first – and only – legal obligation to prevent 
and end genocide, though critics such as Chaim Kaufmann have also noted that attached to the 
obligation are “reservations so crippling that [the United States] is effectively barred from ever 
invoking the treaty against anyone.”84
73  Id. at xi. 
74  Id. at xii. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. at xii-xiii. 
77  Edward Luck, The Responsibility to Protect, offiCe of the u.n. speCial advisor on the prevention of 
genoCide, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/videos/video_5.shtml (last visited Mar. 24, 2015).
78  Id.  
79  Id. 
80  Id.
81  See Jonas Claes, Responsibility to Protect Weighed Down by Misconceptions, u.s. inst. of peaCe (Aug. 16, 2013), available at 
http://www.usip.org/olivebranch/responsibility-protect-weighed-down-misconceptions.  (asserting that policymakers in Washington are 
familiar with RtP only to a “limited extent”, and that they generally view it as a foreign concept).
82  Kaufmann, supra note 12.
83  Emily Backes, On This Day: U.S. Fully Adopts Genocide Convention, enough proJeCt (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.
enoughproject.org/blogs/day-us-ratifies-genocide-convention (stating that the Convention has had little impact on ending genocide 
and the U.S. more concerned with “avoiding labeling the violence genocide – and thus triggering its obligation to 
respond – than actually preventing deaths”).
84  Kaufmann, supra note 12.
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Additionally, President Obama set up an Atrocity Prevention Board (APB) to drive R2P 
efforts in the United States, further signaling the United States’s moral commitment to prevent 
atrocities.85  Later, as the chair of  the APB, Ambassador Power explained, the United States planned 
to implement R2P by prioritizing, organizing, and multilateralizing efforts across the international 
community.86  To achieve this, the United States Institute of  Peace also set up a working group 
on R2P.87  The group recommended a framework for implementing R2P, noting that “The 
Responsibility to Protect is not a tool, but a guiding principle requiring the consideration of  available 
measures to address the risk of  atrocities, in particular preventive diplomatic, legal, and economic 
measures, as well as reactive instruments short of  military action.”88  The working group added that 
“The use of  coercive military force remains a last resort option” where alternatives would prove 
inadequate to stop atrocities.89  
While these measures signaled the commitment that the international community, and the 
United States in particular, made to end genocide and other atrocities, large-scale loss of  human life 
continues today.  The Security Council has only invoked the language of  R2P a handful of  times, 
including against Libya.90  The R2P doctrine has failed to emerge as a meaningful bulwark against 
global atrocities, prompting many to ask whether the strategy is worthwhile.91  This article argues 
that it is – but advocates for a serious reevaluation of  the problems with the doctrine, and more 
importantly, the role the United States must play in making R2P impactful, relevant, and sound.  
In doing so, we turn first to analyzing three cases in which the need for humanitarian 
intervention has surfaced: Kosovo, where prior to the emergence of  R2P, the United States engaged 
militarily to stop Milosevic’s murder of  ethnic Albanians; Libya, where R2P was used to justify the 
toppling of  the Qaddafi regime; and Syria, where the United States has refused to take military 
action against the Syrian government to stop the mass killings ongoing in that country.  
ii. intervention in motion: how the united states has struggled to apply the responsibility 
to proteCt
Three cases best demonstrate how the United States has struggled to uphold its 
Responsibility to Protect: Kosovo, Libya, and Syria.  Within each, there are relative successes 
85  Samantha Power, Statement by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, At an 
Informal Interactive Dialogue on The Responsibility to Protect, u.s. mission to the united nations (Sept. 11, 2013), http://usun.
state.gov/briefing/statements/214066.htm 
86  Id. (noting that the U.S. had also enacted the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty which sought to prohibit the flow of  
weapons to perpetrators of  war crimes and other atrocities).
87  See generally Responsibility to Protect Working Group, u.s. inst. of peaCe available at http://www.usip.org/programs/
projects/responsibility-protect-working-group (last accessed Mar. 24, 2015).
88  Id.
89  Id.
90  Michael Doyle, The Folly of  Protection: Is Intervention Against Qaddafi’s Regime Legal and Legitimate?, foreign affairs 
(Mar. 20, 2011), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67666/michael-w-doyle/the-folly-of-protection (noting that “[t]he 
Libyan intervention represents only the third time since 2005 that the Security Council has invoked R2P to enforce the 
protection of  civilians”).
91  See the eConomist, supra note 4.
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and failures that must be explored to better ascertain how R2P can be successful and what role 
the United States bears in building consensus on the doctrine.  We begin first with the NATO-
led operation in Kosovo, the first U.S.-backed attempt to prevent genocide and atrocities from 
occurring.
A. Attempting Prevention: Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, 1999
In March 1999, by the time the United States urged its NATO allies to begin bombing Serb 
forces in Kosovo, the Balkan conflict had already taken hundreds of  thousands of  lives. 92  Milosevic, 
not one to be deterred by seemingly empty threats of  intervention, had reigned with brutality since 
1991 and was responsible for many of  these deaths.93  In light of  these atrocities, the United States 
determined that Milosevic could no longer operate with impunity or make a mockery out of  the 
U.S. promise to act.94  Thus, when Milosevic continued his killings and rejected a peace settlement, 
NATO began bombing Serb forces in March of  1999.95  After the brief  NATO bombing campaign 
in Srebrenica in 1995, many expected a quick and relatively clean end to the hostilities in Kosovo.96    
The Kosovo campaign, however, proved far more complicated and far less decisive than 
people expected.  The seventy-eight-day bombing campaign failed to prevent thousands of  further 
casualties, and highlighted ample criticism against intervention.97  As Ambassador Power argues, 
the outcome of  Kosovo was “mixed at best.”98  In total, the United States very likely saved many 
more lives than if  they had not acted and eventually helped bring countless war criminals to justice. 
99  Nonetheless, critics pounced on the mistakes made during the mission to support the case against 
humanitarian intervention.100 
Applying Albert Hirschman’s theories of  perversity, futility, and jeopardy, Ambassador Power 
sought to categorize criticisms of  Operations Allied Force and R2P in general.101  She notes that 
detractors of  Operation Allied Force believed the intervention perverted NATO’s credibility, and 
brought to bear a half-hearted humanitarian intervention model that was based on over exaggerated 
human suffering.102  On the futility front, critics also levied that there were no bloodless hands in the 
intractable “civil war” – an ‘internal issue’ in which the United States had manipulatively chosen to 
92  Milestones, supra note 49; See also Interview with Richard Holbrooke, pbs frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html (last accessed Mar. 24, 2015).   
93  Interview with Richard Holbrooke, supra note 91.   
94  See Power, supra note 33, at 445-47 (noting that Clinton administration officials were still reeling from Srebrenica 
and that the “duplicitous antics of  Milosevic” were making them once again look bad). 
95  A Kosovo Chronology, pbs frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/etc/cron.html (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2015). 
96  See Power, supra note 33, at 451 (noting that the NATO bombing was “initially executed casually”). 
97  Id. at 458.
98  Id. at 460. 
99  Id. at 472; See also James Kitfield, Not-So-Sacred Borders, pbs frontline, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/kosovo/procon/kitfield.html (last accessed Mar. 23, 2015).
100  Power, supra note 33, at 461.
101  Id.
102  Id.; See also Doug Bandow, The U.S. Role in Kosovo, Cato institute (March 10, 1999). 
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cast as genocide.103   Finally, Ambassador Power notes critics’ contentions that Albanian retribution 
and the hastening of  Milosevic’s slaughter of  Albanians were key examples of  how intervention not 
only accomplished nothing, but actually jeopardized the goals of  interveners by exacerbating the 
problem.104    
Despite these criticisms, Kosovo marked the first time in history that the United States had 
mobilized at least a portion of  the international community to prevent genocide.105  The importance 
of  this act cannot be taken for granted, especially as it relates to the emergence of  R2P as an 
international doctrine a few short years later.106  For all the things the United States had failed to do, 
Milosevic was no longer being passively observed as he thumbed his murderous tendencies at the 
international community.107  Operation Allied Force accomplished something else as well: it gave 
the United States a leading role in pushing the world to act in the face of  human atrocity.108  This 
outcome, however, has been sullied in the wake of  subsequent humanitarian campaigns.109 
B. Libya: Real Perversion of  Humanitarian Intervention Doctrine?
Whatever lessons should have been gleaned from Kosovo and applied to the precautions 
that had since emerged under R2P, the U.S.-supported action in Libya probably served to 
undermine.110  In 2011, acting under UN Security Council Resolution 1973, a multinational coalition 
began airstrikes in Libya under the auspices of  humanitarian intervention.111  Initially, the mission 
was heralded as a success, showing that NATO could act decisively and collectively.112  Some 
observers even claimed that intervention in Libya had “vindicated” the R2P strategy, and served as 
the model for intervention.113 
However, the aftermath of  the operation in Libya soon came under scrutiny and, as the 
facts started to emerge, revealed that R2P had not been used appropriately.114  Instead, according 
to scholars such as Alan Kuperman, Libya served as the example of  “how not to intervene.”115  
103  Power, supra note 33, at 463.
104  Id. at 466.
105  David L. Phillips, Intervention Lessons From Kosovo for Syria, huffington post (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/david-l-phillips/intervention-lessons-from_b_3858228.html. 
106  Outreach Program on the Rwanda Genocide & the U.N., supra note 61.
107  Interview with Richard Holbrooke, supra note 91.   
108  Kitfield, supra note 98.
109  Martha H. Findlay, Can R2P Survive Libya and Syria, Canadian int’l CounCil 5 (Nov. 2011). 
110  Findlay, supra note 108, at 6 (noting that it took only weeks for the Libya mission to shift to ousting al-Qaddafi 
through the imposition of  the no-fly zone and to supporting rebels).
111  Id.
112  Ivo H. Daalder & James Stavridis, NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run and Intervention, foreign affairs 
(Mar./Apr. 2012), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137073/ivo-h-daalder-and-james-g-stavridis/natos-victory-in-libya. 
113  See id.; See also Stewart Patrick, Libya and the Future of  Humanitarian Intervention: How Qaddafi’s Fall Vindicated Obama 
and RtoP, foreign affairs (Aug. 26, 2011), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68233/stewart-patrick/libya-and-
the-future-of-humanitarian-intervention (claiming that the operation was perfectly timed and executed, showing it was possible 
to carry out a successful military intervention in the name of  R2P). 
114  Findlay, supra note 108, at 6-7. . 
115  Alan J. Kuperman, Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene, harvard Kennedy sChool (Sept. 2013) (stating that 
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Kuperman argued that the goal in Libya was never really humanitarian intervention at its core. 116  
Rather, the goal was to overthrow Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi based on the trumped-up 
and poorly vetted accounts of  a small group of  rebels that asserted that the Libyan government was 
indiscriminately targeting civilians.117  In Kuperman’s calculation, NATO’s support to rebel forces 
worsened the humanitarian situation and created an environment where instability and extremism 
still thrive. 118  
With such a skewed outcome to the Libyan intervention, the United States did R2P a 
disservice.  First, it opened R2P back up to long-standing vulnerabilities and concerns over its 
misuse.119  The aftermath of  U.S. intervention in Libya gave rise to claims that the United States was 
prone to manipulating the numbers and extent of  atrocities for their own political ends.120  Second, 
it revealed the possibility that the United States used humanitarian intervention as a ruse to defeat its 
weaker enemies, while unwittingly (or wittingly) supporting extremists who would ultimately prove 
more dangerous than any unsavory dictator.121  Finally, it added to the myriad bad precedents set by 
U.S. intervention aboard, and degraded the will necessary to confront future and real atrocities.122  
Indeed, critics have often turned back to Libya as an example of  why the United States should not 
intervene in Syria, where genocide is being documented.123  
C. Syria: By No Means Necessary and The Death Toll Rising
In March 2011, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces began targeting pro-democracy 
demonstrators.124  The government’s arrest, torture, and indiscriminate killing of  civilian 
demonstrators led to calls for al-Assad’s resignation.125  As tensions and killings escalated, the 
demonstrators took up arms against the Syrian government, and by 2012, the conflict had escalated 
into a full-scale civil war.126  This war continues to produce casualties today.127
An ongoing U.N. inquiry found that all of  the major players in the civil war have committed 
atrocities since the onset of  the conflict, but drew special attention to the Syrian government’s 
“contrary to Western media reports, Qaddafi did not initiate Libya’s violence by targeting peaceful protesters. The United 
Nations and Amnesty International have documented that in all four Libyan cities initially consumed by civil conflict in 
mid-February 2011—Benghazi, Al Bayda, Tripoli, and Misurata—violence was actually initiated by the protesters” and 
there was no evidence that Libyan forces never targeted civilians indiscriminately). 
116  Id. 
117  Id. 
118  Id.   
119  Findlay, supra note 108, at 6-7. 
120  Id. at 5. 
121  Id.  
122  Id.  
123  Id.  
124  Syria: The Story of  the Conflict, bbC news, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868 (last visited Dec. 1, 
2014). 
125  Id.  
126  Id.  
127  u.n. human rights CounCil, Eighth Report of  the Independent International Commission of  Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, 27th Spec. Sess. GAOR U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/60 (Aug. 13, 2014).  
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continued targeting of  civilians, which they say constitute “gross violations of  human rights.”128  
As of  August 2014, the U.N. reported that Syrian government forces continued to “perpetrate 
massacres and conduct widespread attacks on civilians, systematically committing murder, torture, 
rape and enforced disappearance amounting to crimes against humanity.”129  They also listed as 
infractions the Syrian government’s use of  chlorine gas against civilians, hostage taking, and the use 
of  child soldiers to commit atrocities.130
While the U.N. Security Council has sought to investigate the ongoing atrocities in Syria, 
and passed resolutions aimed at ending them, little has been done to stop al-Assad’s slaughter of  his 
people.131  In September 2013, President Obama issued an arguable “red-line” when he said that the 
United States would be forced to act if  Syria’s chemical weapons were further used or proliferated.132 
This led many to question whether the United States had a clear point of  no turning back on the 
Syrian conflict, and if  so, whether it comported with the R2P doctrine.133  For its part, the United 
States has refused to intervene militarily to stop the al-Assad regime from committing further 
atrocities against civilians in Syria, even though other measures have failed and, at times, the Obama 
Administration has squarely invoked the language necessary to trigger the Responsibility to Protect. 
134  
Inherent in this failure is perhaps recognition that removing al-Assad would neither stabilize 
the region, nor end the civil war that is also responsible for atrocities.135  That said, the reasons 
the United States has avoided intervening against the Syrian government remain as unclear as they 
are likely complex.136  Still, many have voiced concern that the United States and the international 
community are plainly neglecting their duty to intervene, thereby undermining everything that R2P 
stands for.137  USIP expert Manal Omar, citing U.N. estimates that Syrian forces had killed more 
than 191,000 civilians so far in the conflict, warned, “The Syria question is one that the Obama 
128  Id.  
129  Id.  
130  Id.   
131  Findlay, supra note 108, at 5.
132  Glenn Kessler, President Obama and the ‘Red Line’ on Syria’s Chemical Weapons, washington post (Sep. 6, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2013/09/06/president-obama-and-the-red-line-on-syrias-chemical-weapons/. 
133  Id. 
134  Id.  
135  James Holmes, “Responsibility to Protect” Can’t Save Syria, the diplomat (Feb. 1, 2014), http://thediplomat.
com/2014/02/responsibility-to-protect-cant-save-syria/ (arguing that the Security Council will not garner enough votes to 
intervene in Syria, and this is the only way an intervention can be legal). 
136  See, e.g., id. (arguing that no legal framework can accommodate intervention due to the divergent views of  
international partners on intervention); But see Eamon Aloyo, The Responsibility to Protect and The Use of  Force in Syria, the 
hague inst. for global JustiCe (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/index.php?page=Commentary-
Commentary_Articles-Recent_Commentary-The_Responsibility_to_Protect_and_the_Use_of_Force_in_Syria&pid=176&id=170 
(arguing that intervening in Syria is justified under R2P, but instead of  asking whether that intervention empirically meets 
all of  the just ad bellum and R2P precautions, we should focus on whether intervention would decrease the “severity and 
incidence of  mass atrocities” which is still a desirable outcome). 
137  See Aloyo, supra note 135 (arguing that intervening in Syria is justified under R2P, but instead of  asking whether 
that intervention empirically meets all of  the jus ad bellum and R2P precautions, we should focus on whether intervention 
would decrease the “severity and incidence of  mass atrocities” which is still a desirable outcome). 
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administration cannot afford to ignore.”138  
Complicating the situation even more is the fact that United States and certain allies have 
taken recent action to defend their own interests in Syria.139  In September 2014, in response to 
the threat of  expanding Islamic militancy in Syria, the United States and a handful of  allies began 
bombing Islamic State strongholds.140  From this, Omar expressed what is increasingly being seen 
as the double standard on intervention: “Why has President Barack Obama and much of  the world 
rallied around the idea of  stopping the Islamic State, while doing nothing about Syrian President 
Bashar al-Assad’s massive bloodletting of  his own people?”141 
In evaluating this failure, it is important to note that it is not necessarily a result of  
callousness, but rather of  misguided and confused policy, political stalemate, overwhelming domestic 
issues, and apprehension over repeating past mistakes Indeed, the “folly of  prevention” lies mostly 
in its execution, not its intention.142  Yet, it is both intention and execution that we turn our attention 
to next, as this article seeks to defend the R2P doctrine as a viable national security strategy.  
iii. the seCond great awaKening: emerging from the “folly” and providing real 
proteCtion
Evaluating Kosovo, Libya, and Syria provides critical insight into how the United States 
should and should not respond to atrocities.143  To understand the urgency and depth of  America’s 
inability to uphold our Responsibility to Protect, we must first analyze the root of  the problem 
and establish why it poses a threat to America.144  Second, we must look at the debate over R2P to 
inform, rather than completely reroute, U.S. policy.145  Finally, this article suggests specific solutions 
for making the United States a leader and real contributor to R2P.
138  Manal Omar, Wanted: A Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State and Assad, u.s. inst. of peaCe (Oct. 8, 2014), http://
www.usip.org/publications/wanted-coalition-defeat-the-islamic-state-and-assad. 
139  Id. 
140  Max Fischer et al., The US is Bombing Syria: What We Know and Don’t Know, vox media (Sep. 23, 2014), http://www.
vox.com/2014/9/23/6832577/the-us-is-bombing-syria-what-we-know-and-dont-know. 
141  Omar, supra note 137. 
142  Doyle, supra note 89 (noting that “the Libyan intervention represents only the third time since 2005 that the 
Security Council has invoked R2P to enforce the protection of  civilians”).
143  Kuperman, supra note 114 (claiming that “NATO attacked Libyan forces indiscriminately, including some in 
retreat and others in Qaddafi’s hometown of  Sirte, where they posed no threat to civilians. Moreover, NATO continued 
to aid the rebels even when they repeatedly rejected government cease-fire offers that could have ended the violence and 
spared civilians”).  
144  See, e.g., Erin Durkin, Hillary Clinton Criticizes Obama Foreign Policy in Interview: ‘Failure’ To Help Syrian Rebels Led 
To Strong ISIS, n.y. daily news (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/hillary-clinton-criticizes-obama-
foreign-policy-interview-failure-syrian-rebels-led-strong-isis-article-1.1899301 (noting that insecurity in Syrian has led to a security 
implosion and allowed ISIS to expand).
145  Int’l Dev. Research Ctr., supra note 64 at vii, 52-53 (citing that the R2P doctrine is flexible and needs to be backed 
by a conversation on how to implement it, including a code of  conduct implemented between Security Council members 
which would compel invocation if  the five precautionary measures were realized in any situation). 
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A. The Root of  the Problem: How the United States Thinks about R2P and Why We Must Change
Before becoming head of  the APB, then-journalist Samantha Power summed up her 
argument for why the United States has consistently failed in its responsibility to protect.146  First, 
she said, U.S. stakeholders have a propensity for turning a blind eye, or disbelieving atrocities can 
or will happen on such a grand scale.147  Second, domestic politics remains seemingly apathetic to 
the plight of  genocide and other atrocities, and politicians see intervention as more costly than 
inaction. 148  Third, reticent to engage troops even once atrocities emerge, the United States also fails 
to take preventative measures that could have stopped them. 149  Fourth, falling into well-established 
theoretical traps, policymakers and politicians become mired in the debate over the “nature of  the 
violence in question,” and end up viewing U.S. intervention as helpless against the inevitable crises 
and silencing those who advocate action. 150  In short, the United States generally does not see the 
problem, does not believe it can be changed regardless of  our sacrifice, and does not do anything 
meaningful to impact scenarios in which the atrocities arise.  
Besides the tragic and avoidable loss of  human life, this dereliction of  America’s duty cannot 
stand for several reasons.  First, if  Americans do not have the requisite will to fight atrocities, those 
atrocities will go unchecked and create more global instability.151  Syria is a good example of  where 
a localized “civil war” provided ample space for extremism to spread.152  More festering global 
instability poses greater long-term threats to the U.S. homeland, our way of  life, and that of  our 
allies.153  U.S. policymakers and R2P advocates should help the public understand these threats and 
introduce R2P into the everyday lexicon as a preventative tool so America becomes more willing to 
support intervention abroad – and only when it is necessary.154  Put another way, there are countless 
roundtables and working groups debating R2P policy in Washington, but how many Americans 
know or care about the doctrine outside of  the beltway?155  How many understand how it is tied 
to their domestic future and are willing to hold their government accountable for implementing 
R2P?156  R2P will never get the public will behind it, if  it is not talked about and championed as a 
real national security tool. 
146  See Power, supra note 33, at xvii-xviii. 
147  Id.   
148  Id.   
149  Id.   
150  Id.  
151  Findlay, supra note 108, at 6 (arguing that it took only weeks for the Libya mission to shift to ousting al-Qaddafi 
through the imposition of  the no-fly zone and to supporting rebels).
152  Durkin, supra note 143 (claiming that the failure to support certain Syrian rebels or intervene militarily paved the 
way for the security situation there to implode and allow ISIS to expand). 
153  See Joshua Keating, The Mystery of  ISIS’ Foreign Fighters, slate (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_
world_/2014/11/17/are_isis_western_fighters_a_terrifying_security_threat_or_bumbling_tweeting.html (noting how ISIS is likely to 
use foreign fighters trained in the crucible that has become Syria, to attack Western targets).
154  See, e.g., Richard H. Solomon & Lawrence Woocher, Confronting the Challenge of  “Political Will”, u.s. inst. of peaCe 
(Mar. 18, 2010), 
http://www.usip.org/publications/confronting-the-challenge-political-will.  
155  Id.  
156  Id.  
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Second, an inability to lead and act on R2P makes the United States look weak, and worse, 
self-absorbed.  Whether or not President Obama drew ‘red lines’ on Syria is immaterial when, even 
in the face of  known atrocities, the United States still hesitates to act.  The fact is, the United States 
and their international partners know what is going on in Syria.157  Stakeholders should not have to 
threaten action in a tired waiting game while more civilians die over a period of  years.158  Instead the 
international community should not hesitate to act when the R2P triggers are met and the United 
States must take the lead, as they did in Kosovo, in convincing allies to take collective action.159  To 
do anything less makes R2P look empty.  Invoking R2P and, when necessary, the use of  military 
force, would help avoid making our commitment to the doctrine and to genocide prevention look so 
hollow. 
Finally, not acting – not testing our capability in legitimate situations concerning atrocities 
– prevents the United States from adopting lessons learned.160  Similarly, replacing those legitimate 
instances with operations under the guise of  R2P, but that are really for other political ends, 
degrades the capital necessary to act when people are actually in danger.161  If  one thing is clear 
from the United States’ humanitarian intervention strategy, it is that we need to learn how to do it 
better.162  For these reasons, the United States must strive to engage when R2P is triggered and stay 
out of  the fray when it is not.  This will take more careful fact checking than in Libya, and more 
resourceful use of  our intelligence and military capabilities, but it can be done.
These general outlines on why failing at the Responsibility to Protect is unpalatable for 
the United States lead us next into an evaluation of  the criticism and support for humanitarian 
intervention.  Understanding this debate is crucial to framing a solution for the United States to 
prioritize and act on its duty. 
B. Critical Considerations: Allowing the Debate Over Humanitarian Intervention to Shape Better Policy – Not 
Undermine It Entirely
The debate surrounding intervention is very polarizing and roughly aligns with the differing 
schools of  thought present among international relations theorists on how to best address intra-state 
or regional conflict.163  While there are valid arguments on all sides, critics of  the Responsibility to 
Protect have favored abandoning the doctrine altogether.164  Before suggesting solutions for a better 
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R2P strategy, it is important to analyze the arguments on either side of  the R2P debate.  This article 
adopts the view that arguments against R2P are not compelling enough to flatly reject the doctrine.  
Rather, they serve as an opportunity to shape a more sound R2P policy. 
i. Cost, Benefit, and The Stain of  Precedent: The Case Against Humanitarian Intervention
Critics have argued that the humanitarian intervention record over the past twenty years 
reveals that the costs are not worth their effects.  In scholar Benjamin Valentino’s estimation, 
this negative cost-benefit ratio requires the United States to abandon humanitarian military 
intervention in favor of  a new development-centric U.S. policy focused on public health, disaster 
relief, and refugee assistance.165  Analyzing conflicts on a case-by-case basis, Valentino points out 
that “Although humanitarian intervention has undoubtedly saved lives, Americans have seriously 
underappreciated the moral, political, and economic price involved.”166  The costs, according to 
Valentino, include seven distinct consequences, which this article separates into two categories: 
assumable and manageable risks, and lessons-based imperatives that can be used to help redefine the 
United States’ R2P strategy.  
The first three of  Valentino’s critiques fall into the assumable and manageable risks category.  
First, Valentino argues that humanitarian intervention means inevitably arming rebel factions with 
whom we rarely share similar values, respect for human rights, or long-term goals.167  Second, he 
contends that because humanitarian intervention often uses military means, by default, it furthers 
the same loss of  innocent human life that it is trying to stop.168  Third, he asserts that intervention 
allows the enemy to galvanize and mobilize against the intervening party, often hastening their 
genocidal efficacy.169  
However, to a certain extent, these first three consequences all may be avoided or mitigated.  
Take, for example, the advancement of  intelligence capabilities, which have helped better predict and 
respond to crises, allow warfighters to reduce civilian casualties, and empower policymakers to more 
accurately weigh strategic risks and gains.170  When weighed against the costs of  not reacting, those 
mitigating strategies prove negligible at the least. 
Valentino’s remaining critiques present further reaching implications and present risks that 
are admittedly harder to mitigate or assume.  However, classifying them as lessons learned, rather 
than unchangeable truths, casts light on how the United States might reconfigure its R2P policy.  
Using the First Gulf  War as an example, Valentino maintains that intervention falsely encourages 
victims to rise up against brutal regimes – and often leaves them without the necessary support 
165  Benjamin Valentino, The True Costs of  Humanitarian Intervention: 
The Hard Truth About a Noble Notion, foreign affairs (Nov./Dec. 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136542/
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to continue fighting their oppressors.171  Imagine however, if  no rebellion had been urged in Iraq 
in 1991, or if  before it was, the United States was in place and ready to assist.  The outcome then 
probably would have been different – or at least more controllable and resulting in fewer casualties. 
Valentino continues, declaring that precedent for conducting NATO-led operations 
without U.N. Security Council approval has undermined the United Nations as the rightful leader 
of  intervention operations.172  Perhaps, though, R2P requires more flexibility than what the U.N. 
Security Council can provide; if  that body cannot or will not act, it need not be the one that 
determines whether intervention is appropriate.173  Certainly, the intractable positions and interests 
of  the Security Council’s members continue to make it unlikely that each will agree when and how to 
act, especially in Syria.  This does not mean that intra-state atrocities should go unchecked.  
Valentino also reasons that intervention degrades the United States’ standing among other 
international powers, and that allies no longer trust America’s handling of  geopolitical crises.174  
However, the same could be said of  America’s failure to act and uphold our core values throughout 
the world.  Here, the choice is a matter of  losing some trust or losing our identity completely.  
Finally, Valentino finds that intervention results in “lost opportunity costs” wherein the 
money used to conduct operations could have been used to advance public health initiatives and 
other life-saving humanitarian measures.175  It is true that there are many military and humanitarian 
priorities in the world today, but R2P is a long-term investment that goes beyond building public 
health or other infrastructures in places where security is still at an overwhelming deficit.  Although 
it appears that the R2P investment may be too high in the short term, it stands to ultimately help 
lessen the world’s problems in the long run by improving quality of  life through the provision of  
basic human security first – put another way, infrastructure development cannot meaningfully occur 
without a safe and secure environment that facilitates service delivery in the first instance. 
Valentino, like many critics, leaves the door open for very limited humanitarian intervention 
only when absolutely necessary.  He reasons that one such instance might be in the case of  border 
closures where oppressive regimes prevent the flight of  refugees.176  However, this brand of  purely 
reactionary intervention neglects to address the root cause, provide for those who are unable to 
flee, and still begs the basic question: what is “enough” brutality to know that the line has been 
crossed and that military intervention is necessary?  Of  course, for each of  these critiques, there are 
worthwhile counterpoints to which we now turn. 
ii. What Humanity Requires: The Case for Humanitarian Intervention
Others, taking a broader and more human view of  the net gain yielded by humanitarian 
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intervention, believe there is no replacement for the Responsibility to Protect.177  Supporters 
point out that R2P has decreased the overall prevalence of  global conflict, lowered the amount 
of  lives lost in those conflicts, and institutionalized international norms against violence – all 
critical advancements in their own right.178  Western and Goldstein sum up this view, noting that 
humanitarian intervention belongs squarely in the “growing tool kit of  conflict management 
strategies that includes today’s more robust peacekeeping operations and increasingly effective 
international criminal justice mechanisms.”179  
Notwithstanding views on whether humanitarian intervention has had a positive or negative 
effect, proponents have also argued that the responsibility to intervene is a moral imperative and 
therefore, cannot be weighed in terms of  cost-benefit ratio.  Rather, humanitarian intervention, with 
R2P as its decisive manifesto, requires members of  the international community to do what is right as 
fellow members of  the human race – that is, protect those that are most vulnerable.180  Ambassador 
Power notes, however, that the moral imperative has rarely ever been sufficient to promote action.181  
She submits that the morality argument has often had to be combined with one of  self-interest to 
get people to listen.182 
While the moral imperative argument may not be sufficient, it is nonetheless valid and 
necessary.  Every day, the United States asks others to honor democracy, human rights, and freedom. 
The hypocrisy of  the United States failing to do as they preach further weakens our political capital, 
creates a generation of  dissidents, and leaves open, rather than secures the future of  freedom for 
our posterity.  Even if  actors cannot agree that R2P is the right thing to do, certainly there must 
be some recognition that international stakeholders need to set a precedent for protection or risk 
undermining the efficacy of  the U.N.183 This is where self-interest factors into otherwise altruistic 
decision-making.
C. What Can the United States Do to Build Consensus, Lead on R2P, and Stop Atrocities
Failing in our responsibility to protect is neither advisable nor sustainable.  In order to respond 
to this failure, the United States must take measures to correct course.184  As this article seeks to define 
how the United States might better fulfill its recognized R2P obligations, the following suggests ways 
America can clarify its humanitarian intervention strategy and become a global leader in the R2P 
movement.185  Ultimately, though, no strategy is complete without a willingness to follow through. 
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Therefore, this article concludes with a recommendation that the United States act in the face of  
ongoing humanitarian crises.
First, the United States should seek to reinvigorate the dialogue on the Responsibility to 
Protect, elevating action on R2P as a national priority and changing public discourse on the topic.186 
To the extent that the shortfalls of  past conflicts continue to inhibit our capability to have an honest 
discussion about genocide and atrocities today, the two need to be separated.187  This can be achieved 
at relatively low cost by publicly recognizing that the United States has a moral duty to protect and 
making a clear case for what national security interests are implicated in atrocity situations.188  As a 
precursor to this dialogue, policymakers also need to recognize where R2P has not been used at the 
right times and for the right purposes, such as in Syria and Libya. 
Second, the U.S. must take stock of  our current laws mandating action in the face of  genocide, 
and reevaluate where they are inadequate, ambiguous, or plainly not being followed.  As mentioned 
in Part I of  this article, the Genocide Convention is so saddled with burdensome requirements that 
it remains largely meaningless as a legal basis for invoking U.S. action.189  This necessitates a deeper 
look at what purpose the Convention serves in the U.S. legal regime, as well as what form potential 
legislative amendments must take in order to trigger U.S. action.190  Likewise, the Responsibility to 
Protect roundtable in Washington should undertake a comprehensive policy review to extract lessons 
learned and recommend a way ahead for policymakers to pursue reform.  U.S. policymakers would 
also be well advised to revisit the document that introduced the Responsibility to Protect, and craft 
responses that would put into action the recommendations made in that document.191
Third, the U.S. must re-establish (or establish in the first place) credibility in identifying 
human rights atrocities worthy of  invoking R2P.  This can be accomplished by creating a special 
standing joint task force that uses the vast intelligence and military resources at our disposal to identify 
atrocities.192  Policymakers should press the intelligence community to produce intelligence that helps 
to identify specific threats to civilians and use that intelligence to shape policy recommendations.  This 
information should be shared with international stakeholders, and a more comprehensive analytical 
framework developed to keep all participants apprised of  developments underlying genocide and 
human rights atrocities.193 
Fourth, the United States must lead efforts to promote sustainable peace in post-genocide 
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situations, and to stabilize the situation in pre-conflict areas.  This starts with the United States being 
a stronger advocate for R2P in general, but it ranges up to being able to circumvent U.N. inaction 
and invoke the power of  NATO to respond to real or looming atrocities – although, not without 
first taking every measure to push the Security Council to act and the U.N. to fulfill its mandate.194 
Although conventional wisdom tells us that collective action can be legitimate, but not necessarily 
legal, if  international community members act without the approval of  the U.N. Security Council, 
this concept too must be reevaluated.195  The U.N. Security Council is hobbled by having to entertain 
sometimes diametrically opposed interests, as evidenced in their inability to authorize military action 
by resolution in cases where genocide was patently clear.196  Even when it elects not to act, that fact 
should not end the discussion on protection. 
Finally, and underlying all of  these recommendations, the United States should act with 
appropriate force when genocide, war crimes, and human rights atrocities occur.197  It should be clear 
when military action will be used – not threatened and then never executed, or used solely to topple 
regimes.198  This action starts in Syria, where many continue to die at the hands of  a brutal regime.199 
Acting does not necessarily mean regime change, although it could if  that is what the situation calls 
for.  It also does not mean supporting rebel groups who are fighting to later harm people.  Any action 
must comport, to every extent possible, with basic principles laid out by the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s initial manifesto.200
iv. ConClusion
Genocide, war crimes, and human rights atrocities are blights on humanity.  Unfortunately, 
the international community has been unable to prevent the conflicts that produce these events.  
Impediments to prevention are only likely to increase as global instability rises.  However, the past 
and the future should not deter action today.  The United States can and should prevent the further 
degradation of  global and human security by resetting the intervention discussion, prioritizing R2P 
as a key national security doctrine, and rallying fellow stakeholders in support of  collective action 
when necessary.  Though some believe the Responsibility to Protect is a thing of  the past, the 
United States and their international partners cannot take the risk of  abandoning our duties toward 
humanity or discarding a critical national security instrument. 
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